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Abstract
A large-scale Public Health Emergency (PHE), like a severe influenza pandemic can generate 
large numbers of critically ill patients in a short time. We modeled the number of mechanical 
ventilators that could be used in addition to the number of hospital-based ventilators currently in 
use. We identified key components of the healthcare system needed to deliver ventilation therapy, 
quantified the maximum number of additional ventilators that each key component could support 
at various capacity levels (i.e. conventional, contingency and crisis) and determined the 
constraining key component at each capacity level. Our study results showed that U.S. hospitals 
could absorb between 26,200 and 56,300 additional ventilators at the peak of a national influenza 
pandemic outbreak with robust pre-pandemic planning. This methodology could be adapted by 
emergency planners to determine stockpiling goals for critical resources or identify alternatives to 
manage overwhelming critical care need.
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Large-scale public health emergencies (PHEs) due to an influenza pandemic, chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents can generate large numbers of patients 
with respiratory illness in a short time. Therefore, the U.S. health care system must be 
prepared to meet a large surge in the number of patients that would need respiratory care. 
Illustrating the potential for increased need for mechanical ventilation, a study of 47 
Maryland hospitals over a period of 12 years, including the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, 
found a statistically significant 7% increase in mechanical ventilator use during intense 
influenza periods compared to non-influenza periods. (1) Erikson et. al. also found that 7% 
to 9% of pediatric patients admitted to 43 U.S. children’s hospitals with seasonal influenza 
and presumed 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza needed mechanical ventilation. (2) To 
manage potentially larger surges in respiratory illness that could be caused by a virulent 
influenza strain, the U.S. Federal government maintains in the Strategic National Stockpile 
(SNS) a supply of mechanical ventilators that can be distributed to U.S. hospitals in a large-
scale PHE.
Many acute care hospitals maintain an inventory of mechanical ventilators on site to match 
routine patient care needs; additional units can be procured or leased from medical supply 
vendors as needed. (3, 4) One study estimated that U.S. acute care hospitals own 
approximately 62,000 full-feature mechanical ventilators, of which 24,000 (39%) has the 
capability to ventilate pediatric and neonatal patients. The study also reported an additional 
98,000 ventilators that are not full-featured but are maintained in U.S. hospitals. (5) 
However, it is uncertain what proportion of these ventilators are in use at any one time or 
what capacity is available in the U.S. healthcare system to absorb a surge in mechanical 
ventilation need.
The current U.S. health care system may have limited capacity to use additional mechanical 
ventilators during a large-scale PHE. In this paper, we provide a model to estimate the surge 
capacity of the U.S. health care system to use additional or stockpiled mechanical 
ventilators. This assessment includes identifying health system components (supplies, space, 
staff and systems) that may constrain the number of ventilators that could be effectively 
used during the peak of a national influenza pandemic outbreak. The methodology used for 
this assessment can be adapted by emergency planners at the facility, local, and state level 
to: 1) project critical care surge capacity; 2) determine stockpiling goals for critical care 
resources; 3) identify gaps in emergency preparedness; or 4) identify alternatives to manage 
overwhelming critical care need.
Methods
Ventilator Capacity-based Assessment
We assessed the capacity of the U.S. healthcare system to rapidly absorb additional 
mechanical ventilators during a large-scale PHE using the following steps. First, we 
identified the key components of the healthcare system needed to effectively deliver 
ventilation therapy to patients. Secondly, we quantified the maximum number of additional 
ventilators that each of the key components could effectively support at various capacity 
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levels (i.e., conventional, contingency and crisis). (6) According to the Institute of Medicine 
(IOM), conventional capacity is defined as the usual and normal patient-care where facilities 
and staff meet their normal goals in providing care. Contingency capacity requires minor 
adaptation that may have minor consequences for standards of care, but adaptations are not 
enough to result in significant changes to standards of care. Crisis capacity is defined as a 
fundamental, systematic change in which standards of care are significantly altered in order 
to allow treatment of a greater number of patients. (6) Third, we determined the constraining 
key component at each capacity level to determine the system’s surge capacity.
Components necessary to provide mechanical ventilation
The four key components necessary to provide ventilation therapy to a patient include the 
necessary equipment such as ventilators and ancillary supplies including circuits and 
bacterial filters (supplies), hospital beds equipped for ventilation and comprehensive critical 
care (space), and specialized medical personnel to manage patients on mechanical 
ventilators (staff). (3) There is also a need for readily accessible and exercised plans to 
rapidly increase capacity for patients that require mechanical ventilation (systems) (Figure 
1).
Quantification of healthcare components
The estimated number of ventilators that can be used is the key outcome component for this 
study. Staffed beds are the key input component for space. Specially trained critical care 
physicians, nurses and respiratory therapists are the key input components for staff. The 
systems input component, for example planning and communications, is difficult to 
quantify. Thus, it was not considered in this assessment. As a result, quantification of 
healthcare input components was limited to the space and staff as outlined below.
Space—Bed space for patients that need mechanical ventilation requires specific 
functionalities such as electricity, oxygen, suction, medical gas, and monitoring equipment. 
In acute care hospitals, these functionalities are usually found in critical care or intensive 
care units. In a large-scale PHE, additional critical care space could be created through the 
use of intermediate care beds (e.g. step-down beds, post-operative care beds, and emergency 
care beds) and potentially general ward beds that could be equipped with the functionalities 
needed to provide ventilation care. (3)
To understand the space (i.e., excess beds) available to provide ventilation care at the 
different capacity levels, we obtained the estimate of staffed beds in the U.S. by bed type (7) 
and calculated the proportion of staffed beds that would be available to treat a surge of 
patients needing mechanical ventilation. Staffed beds are beds for which trained staffs are on 
hand and physically available to care for patients. (8) Recent data indicate an annual average 
availability of 32% for both critical care and non-critical care beds. (9 – 11) However, the 
literature suggests that annual averages in bed availability do not reflect weekly and seasonal 
variation. (12) As a result, we assumed a lower 10% to 20% bed availability across all 
capacity levels to address ventilation need at the peak of an influenza pandemic outbreak (8 
– 10 days). Our 10% to 20% bed availability assumption was also informed by expert 
opinion.
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At the conventional capacity level, we assumed only currently staffed but unoccupied 
critical care beds would be available for use by ventilated patients. At the contingency 
capacity level, we included staffed but unoccupied intermediate care beds (e.g., step-down 
beds, postoperative care, and emergency department beds) in our estimate of bed surge 
capacity. (7) At the crisis capacity level, we expanded bed space to staffed but unoccupied 
general ward beds that could be equipped with capabilities to support ventilated patients. (7) 
We excluded specialty care beds such as neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) beds, nursery 
beds, psychiatric beds, rehabilitation beds and nursing home beds. These beds were judged 
by subject matter experts as either unsuitable for general patient needs because they were 
specific to a patient population (i.e. neonates, newborns, or older adults), or have limited 
surge capacity. (7) We calculated the number of beds available for use by ventilated patients 
at the peak of an influenza pandemic for each capacity level by multiplying the number of 
staffed beds in each bed type category (e.g., intermediate, general ward) in the U.S. 
healthcare system by the previously described 10% – 20% peak bed availability.
Staff—Management of patients on mechanical ventilators requires a team of critical care 
personnel to optimize clinical outcomes. Personnel trained in the management of patients on 
mechanical ventilators include critical care physicians, critical care nurses, and respiratory 
therapists. In a large-scale PHE where critical care personnel are likely to be in short supply, 
staff capacity could be enhanced at the contingency and crisis capacity levels by: 1) 
extending provider working hours; 2) increasing patient to provider ratios (i.e. more patients 
per provider); and 3) augmenting critical care personnel with non-critical care personnel 
using a two-tier staffing model. In a two-tier staffing model, non-critical care personnel 
assume the more general aspects of patient care and function under the direct supervision of 
critical care personnel. (13 – 15) However, enhancement of staff capacity could be 
constrained by: 1) unacceptable extensions of work hours for trained personnel; 2) staff 
absenteeism due to personal illness or the need to care for others who are ill and; 3) inability 
to quickly and sufficiently train healthcare personnel who have no prior critical care 
experience to manage patients on mechanical ventilators.
To calculate the number of staff that would be available to treat a surge of patients on 
mechanical ventilators, we assumed that: 1) the number of trained medical personnel would 
correlate with the number of staffed beds maintained by hospitals; 2) medical personnel 
would work one 12-hour shift per day; and 3) 10% to 20% of medical personnel would be 
available as surge capacity, consistent with the 10% to 20% staffed bed availability 
assumption. While we did not take absenteeism of healthcare workers into account explicitly 
in the model, we did perform a sensitivity analysis to examine the impact of absenteeism on 
staff availability, as described below. Other staff assumptions were specific to the capacity 
level. At the conventional capacity level, health provider projections were limited to critical 
care personnel who primarily manage patients on mechanical ventilators (i.e., critical and 
pulmonary care physicians, critical care nurses, and respiratory therapists). (3) At the 
conventional capacity level, we assumed a patient to physician ratio of 10:1 to 15:1 (17), 
patient to critical care nurse ratio of 1:1 (15), and patient to respiratory therapist ratio of 4:1 
to 6:1. (18)
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At the contingency capacity level, the type of physicians delivering care to ventilated 
patients were expanded to include other medical specialties such as anesthesiologists, 
emergency care physicians, and cardio-thoracic surgeons with experience in managing 
patients on mechanical ventilators. In addition, the ratio of patient to healthcare provider was 
expanded for respiratory therapists and critical care nurses. At the contingency capacity 
level, we maintained a patient to physician ratio of 10:1 to 15:1 (17), expanded the patient to 
critical care nurse ratio to 2:1, (15) and expanded the patient to respiratory therapist ratio 
range to 7:1 to 9:1. (18)
At the crisis capacity level, critical care personnel were augmented with non-critical care 
personnel using already described two-tier staffing model. Each supervisory critical care 
physician would work with up to four non-critical care physicians. Each non-critical care 
physician would manage up to six patients, providing a patient to critical care physician ratio 
of 24:1 consistent with the Task Force for Mass Critical Care recommendations for 
physician two-tier staffing model. For critical care nurses, we assumed that three non-critical 
care nurses would work under the supervision of a critical care nurse, and each non-critical 
care nurse would manage up to two patients, providing a range of patient to critical care 
nurse ratio of 3:1 to 6:1. (15) Similarly, for respiratory therapists, we assumed that up to four 
respiratory extenders would work with a respiratory therapist and each respiratory extender 
would manage up to three patients, providing a range of patient to respiratory therapist ratio 
of 10:1 to 12:1. Respiratory extenders could be respiratory therapists working in 
administrative positions, respiratory therapy students, nurses and other healthcare 
professionals involved in patient care. (14, 15) All of the patient to staff ratios used for 
contingency and crisis capacity levels in this assessment were previously recommended by 
the Task Force for Mass Critical Care and Project extreme. (13 – 15) Finally, to project the 
number of medical personnel that would be available at each capacity level, we divided the 
number of staff in each medical personnel category by the number of shifts per day (two 
shifts per day), and multiplied the outcome by the 10% to 20% staff availability. This value 
was then multiplied by the patient to provider ratio to obtain the number of patients that 
could be treated for each medical personnel category at the peak of an influenza pandemic 
outbreak.
Sensitivity analysis—We tested the impact of varying the assumptions for space and 
staff availability on additional ventilation capacity. We varied the bed availability estimate 
from 10% to 20%, to 20% to 60% in a step-wise fashion across all capacity levels based on 
the range of bed availability data across U.S hospitals. (9 – 11) We also assumed a 20% 
reduction in staff availability due to staff absenteeism. (16) All other factors and 
assumptions remained the same.
Results
Space
As of November 2013, there were an estimated 1,098,849 staffed beds in the U.S. healthcare 
system. (7) Of these, 81,790 (7%) were adult and pediatric critical care beds, 180,000 (17%) 
were intermediate care beds (step-down beds, post-operative care beds, emergency care 
Ajao et al. Page 5













bed), 212,587 (19%) were specialty care beds (neonatal ICU beds, nursery beds, psychiatric 
beds, rehabilitation beds and nursing home beds), and 624,472 (57%) were general ward 
beds (Table 1). (7)
At the peak of an influenza pandemic outbreak, 8,200 to 16,400 additional patients could be 
ventilated nationally based on 81,790 critical care beds in the U.S. healthcare system and 
10% to 20% bed availability at the conventional capacity level (Table 1). At the contingency 
capacity level, 26,200 to 52,400 additional patients could be ventilated nationally based on 
261,790 intermediate care beds in the U.S. healthcare system and 10% to 20% bed 
availability (Table 1). At the crisis capacity level, 88,600 to 177,300 additional patients 
could be ventilated nationally based on 886,262 general ward beds (non-specialty care beds) 
in the U.S. healthcare system and 10% to 20% bed availability (Table 1). The contingency 
and crisis capacity level increased the number of staffed beds available to ventilate patients 
approximately three-fold and eleven-fold respectively over the conventional capacity level 
(Table 2).
Staff
As of November 2013, there were an estimated 799,500 physicians in the United States. (20) 
About 12,600 (1.6%) were critical care and pulmonary care physicians, 41,690 (5.2 %) were 
anesthesiologists, 35,650 (4.5%) were emergency care physicians, 4,730 (0.6%) were 
cardio-thoracic surgeons, and 704,830 (88.1%) were other physician specialty or primary 
care physicians. (19 – 22) The number of respiratory therapists was estimated to be 112,500 
(23) while critical care nurses were estimated to be 503,124. (24) Based on this number of 
healthcare workers in the U.S. healthcare system, a 12 hour shift per day, 10% to 20% staff 
availability and patient to healthcare worker ratios described in the methods section, we 
projected the number of additional patients that could be treated nationally at the peak of an 
influenza pandemic outbreak for the different healthcare worker categories at the three 
capacity levels. At the conventional capacity level there are sufficient critical care 
physicians to ventilate 6,300 to 18,900 additional patients; there are sufficient respiratory 
therapists to ventilate 22,500 to 67,500 additional patients; and there are sufficient critical 
care nurses to ventilate 25,200 to 50,300 additional patients (Table 1). At the contingency 
capacity level there are sufficient physicians to ventilate 47,800 to 143,400 additional 
patients; there are sufficient respiratory therapists to ventilate, 39,400 to 101,300 additional 
patients; and there are sufficient critical care nurses to ventilate 50,300 to 101,600 additional 
patients (Table 1). At the crisis capacity level there are sufficient physicians to ventilate 
114,700 to 229,500 additional patients; there are sufficient respiratory therapists to ventilate 
56,300 to 135,000 additional patients; and there are sufficient critical care nurses to ventilate 
75,500 to 301,900 additional patients (Table 1). The contingency capacity level increased 
the number of additional patients that could be ventilated by physicians, respiratory 
therapists, and critical care nurses at least seven-, one and a half-, and two- fold, 
respectively, over the conventional capacity level. The crisis capacity level increased the 
number of additional patients that could be ventilated by physicians, respiratory therapists, 
and critical care nurses at least twelve-, two-, and three- fold, respectively, over the 
conventional capacity level (Table 1).
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Ventilation capacity model output
This assessment showed that the capacity of the U.S. healthcare system to provide 
ventilation therapy could be constrained by different key components at each capacity level 
(Table 2). The number of available critical care physicians was the most constraining key 
component at the conventional capacity level, limiting the maximum number of ventilated 
patients to 18,900. The number of available critical care and intermediate care beds was the 
constraining key component at the contingency capacity level, limiting the maximum 
number of ventilated patients to 52,400. At the crisis capacity level, the number of available 
respiratory therapists was the key constraining component, limiting the maximum number of 
ventilated patients to 135,000. (Table 2) This assessment showed that even if bed capacity 
and some staff capacity could be expanded by including general ward beds and employing 
the services of noncritical care physicians and nurses, U.S. ventilation capacity would still 
be limited by the number of trained respiratory therapists at the crisis capacity level.
Sensitivity Analysis
Expanding staffed bed availability from 10% to 20%; to 20% to 60% expanded the surge 
capacity to treat patients two to three folds (Tables 2 and 3). This sensitivity analysis 
showed that the number of mechanical ventilators that could be absorbed during a public 
health emergency was most sensitive to the staffed bed availability assumption for the 
following reasons: (1) the shift in the staffed bed availability range was large (from 10% to 
20%, to 20% to 60%); and (2) increase to staffed bed availability also increased the number 
of staff available. Therefore, these results emphasize the importance of accurate staffed bed 
availability information when responding to a large-scale PHE. While factoring in 
absenteeism did reduce the number of staff available, the effect in our model was far 
outweighed by the large increase in staffed bed availability for the reasons mentioned above.
Discussion
Summary of main findings
In a large-scale PHE, hospitals, healthcare coalitions, local, state and federal healthcare 
resources may be constrained. The objective of this assessment was to provide a method for 
projecting the capacity of the U.S. health care system to effectively use stockpiled 
mechanical ventilators in preparation for a large-scale PHE such as an influenza pandemic. 
This assessment showed that the number of additional mechanical ventilators that could be 
effectively used during the peak of a severe influenza pandemic ranged from approximately 
26,200 to 56,300. This range represents the projected number of additional mechanical 
ventilators that could be effectively used by the U.S healthcare system at the lower boundary 
of contingency and crisis capacity levels. As we approach the upper boundary of the range at 
56,300 ventilators, subject matter experts interviewed as part of this project expressed 
concern that various components of the health care system would become stressed and there 
is uncertainty that health care services could be effectively delivered.
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Main public health implications
This capabilities-based approach provides several benefits for emergency planning: 1) 
provides emergency planners at all levels (local, state, federal) with a practical method for 
projecting levels of medical resources that could be used by taking into account the health 
systems’ capacity to absorb these resources during an emergency; 2) provides an evidence-
based analytical model for emergency planners to identify gaps in preparedness; 3) identifies 
alternatives to manage overwhelming critical care need; and 4) likely supports a more 
efficient allocation of scarce resources for stockpiling. Furthermore, the impact of increasing 
staffed bed availability in the sensitivity analysis highlights the importance of regional 
coalition planning to make hospital beds available during large-scale PHEs. This analytical 
approach was used to inform the Strategic National Stockpile ventilator stockpiling goal, 
identify national ventilation preparedness gaps, and create an evidence-based foundation for 
development of plans to improve national mechanical ventilation capacity and therefore 
overall influenza pandemic preparedness.
Limitations
This planning assessment provides a good method for assessing capacity, but has potential 
limitations. Since large-scale PHEs are rare, there may be limited data to inform some of the 
assumptions that are needed for similar assessments. The assumptions and data used in the 
assessment presented here at the contingency and crisis capacity levels were based on the 
best available evidence but were largely untested. In addition, we made simplified model 
assumptions to approximate surge capacity projections. For example, we assumed a static 
range for bed availability (10% to 20%) that does not account for daily variation in bed 
availability. Finally, we did not incorporate the “systems” component such as resource 
sharing among facilities in the same network, and additional factors such as communications 
and logistics planning, into this assessment as these factors and their potential impacts were 
difficult to quantify.
Conclusion
For effective planning, emergency planners at all levels need to understand their healthcare 
systems’ capacity to expand care for a surge of critically ill patients and the capability to 
absorb additional resources. This assessment provides a model for projecting a healthcare 
systems’ surge capacity for large-scale PHEs. This model can be adoption and adapted to 
assist emergency planners at the facility, local and state levels to identify gaps in emergency 
preparedness, determine stockpiling goals for critical care resources, or identify alternative 
policies and protocols to manage increased need for critical care resources in a large-scale 
PHE.
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The U.S. healthcare system has limited capacity to absorb additional mechanical 
ventilators during a large-scale public health emergency; therefore it is necessary for 
emergency planners to project critical care surge capacity for effective planning.
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Components needed for effective mechanical ventilation in response to a large-scale PHE
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